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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4479
This paper takes stock of labor market developments 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the period 2001-2004, 
using the panel Living Standards Measurement 
Study/Living in Bosnia and Herzegovina survey. The 
analysis estimates a multinomial logit model of labor 
market transitions by state of origin (employment, 
unemployment, and inactivity) following the 
specification of widely used models of transition 
probabilities, and analyzes the impact of standard 
covariates. The results provide strong evidence that 
there are indeed significant differences in labor market 
transitions by gender, age, education, and geographic 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia 
Region—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the economic transition in former centrally planned 
economies. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at etiongson@worldbank.org.  
location. Using the panel structure of the multi-topic 
survey data, the authors find that these transitions are 
related to welfare dynamics, with welfare levels evolving 
differently for various groups depending on their labor 
market trajectories. The findings show that current labor 
market trends reflecting women’s movement out of labor 
markets and laid-off male workers accepting informal 
sector jobs characterized by low productivity will lead 
to adverse social outcomes. These outcomes could be 
averted if the planned enterprise reform program creates 
a more favorable business environment and leads to faster 
restructuring and growth of firms. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
A large empirical literature has emerged in recent years on the economic benefits 
and consequences of the transition from centrally planned to market economies. Some of 
these empirical studies were an effort to understand the impact of structural and policy 
reforms on economic output at a fairly broad level (e.g., Selowsky and Martin 1997), 
with some focusing on reform reversals and their impact on economic activity (e.g., 
Merlevede 2003) or some recent studies revisiting and claiming to overturn some of the 
findings of the “first generation” of studies regarding the benefits of certain reform 
programs (Godoy and Stiglitz 2006). Others have examined the consequences of reform 
much more narrowly and at the microeconomic level, focusing, for example, on the 
employment and productivity consequences of privatization and enterprise restructuring. 
Much of what we know in this area is drawn from the experience of displaced workers in 
countries undergoing rapid reform. Relatively less is known of stalled or incomplete 
reform and the impact on local labor markets. Bosnia and Herzegovina represent one 
such case. 
 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina has achieved significant progress in economic 
reconstruction and recovery since the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, supported by 
substantial volumes of international financial assistance. The GDP and merchandise 
exports have steadily been increasing, fiscal accounts have improved, domestic demand 
has been strengthening, and inflation rates have been modest. The country has 
experienced relative social and political stability while gradually working toward state 
building. On structural reforms underpinning the transition to a market economy, 
however, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress has been relatively uneven. On some fronts, 
such as financial sector reform, some progress has been made. With respect to 
privatization and enterprise restructuring, as well as private sector contributions to GDP, 
however, the country lags many of its neighbors in the region. This has clear implications 
for local job creation, labor market outcomes, and poverty. However, little is known in 
the empirical literature on labor market developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
  
This paper takes stock of labor market developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BH) over 2001 to 2004, using the panel Living Standards Measurement Study 
                                                 
2 This paper was prepared under the World Bank’s 2005 Bosnia and Herzegovina Programmatic Poverty 
Assessment with support from central PSIA funds. We are grateful to the EPPU/DEP and DFID for 
supporting the LSMS/Living in BH panel survey, Fahrudin Memic (EPPU) for providing data on 
welfare/poverty based on the LSMS, and Tarik Sahovic (ECSPF) for providing summary information on 
the financial conditions of a sample of firms in the RS. Valuable comments and suggestions were received 
from Asad Alam, Christian Bodewig, Jean Fares, Csaba Feher, Ardo Hansson, Zlatko Hurtic, Ivailo 
Izvorski, Toby Linden, Maniza B. Naqvi, Stefano Paternostro, Zafiris Tzannatos, Milan Vodopivec, and 
Penny Williams at various stages of the analysis. The usual disclaimer applies. 
  2(LSMS)/Living in BH survey, a consistent data source that allows the accurate 
measurement of wage and employment dynamics, informal sector employment, 
unemployment and other key labor market and living standards characteristics at the 
individual level. It also provides a formal analysis of labor market transitions into and out 
of employment, unemployment, and inactivity to better understand their covariates and 
how labor market disadvantages are distributed across demographic groups. Second, it 
relates these labor market developments to broad changes, if any, in the poverty risk 
faced by selected groups. It speculates on the links between labor market transitions and 
welfare over the 2001 to 2004 period. Unlike the previous section which relies on a 
widely-used, formal multinomial logit model of labor market transitions, this section of 
the paper relies on a less formal, and more intuitive, discussion of the linkages between 
labor market developments and the impact on workers at various points of the welfare 
distribution. Such an approach reflects the technical difficulties of a comprehensive 
assessment of transitions in and out of poverty. A more formal modeling exercise is left 
for future research.  Finally, this paper relates these documented labor market 
developments to the stalled enterprise restructuring program and explores a number 
policy options available to the government. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents an overview of 
recent labor market developments. Section III assesses labor market transition more 
systematically using a multinomial logit model. Section IV relates these labor market 
development and transition to broad welfare outcomes. Section V concludes with a 




II.  Labor Market Developments, 2001 to 2004 
 
In recent years, BH labor force participation rate has increased sharply but still 
remains relatively low compared to other transition economies.
3 Between 2001 and 2004, 
the labor force participation rate increased by about 10 percentage points to 59 percent 
(Table 1). This is a substantial increase and it is not clear what is driving it. As explained 
below, this increase may be driven in part by the increase in unemployment between 
2001 and 2002 and informal sector dynamism over the last our years.  
 
Despite this rapid increase in labor force participation, BH is still at the lower end 
of average participation rates in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region. Based on a 
sample of transition economies in 2001-2002, the labor force participation rate in BH is 
lower than Croatia, Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Latvia, Slovenia, Georgia, 
Slovakia, Estonia, Czech Republic, and Lithuania and comparable to Hungary and 
Armenia. The unweighted average participation rate in the sample is 66 percent with 
Lithuania having the highest rate (71 percent). Meanwhile, the average female 
participation rate for the same group of countries is 60 percent with Lithuania again 
                                                 
3 The labor market indicators reported in this paper follow the standard ILO definitions, unless otherwise 
indicated (e.g., registered unemployment). One exception is the 2003 wave, where ILO-consistent 
unemployment indicators could not be computed due to “routing error.” 
  3having the highest female participation rate at 67 percent. In contrast, the BH female 





Table 1. Key Labor Market Indicators
(In units as indicated)
2001 2002 2004
Unemployment rate (in percent of labor force)
A l l 1 6 . 02 1 . 62 2
Federation 16.9 21.6 20.8
Republika Srpska 15.3 21.5 23.8
M e n 1 5 . 31 9 . 62 1
W o m e n 1 7 . 52 5 . 12 4
Employment rate (in percent of working age population)
A l l 4 0 . 44 1 . 84 5
Federation 34.6 36.4 43.4
Republika Srpska 46.4 47.5 47.3
M e n 5 3 . 95 5 . 45 9
W o m e n 2 7 . 22 8 . 53 2
Labor force participation rate (in percent of working age population)
A l l 4 8 . 15 3 . 35 9
Federation 42.2 47.1 55.8
Republika Srpska 55.4 60.9 63.0
M e n 6 3 . 66 8 . 97 5
W o m e n 3 2 . 93 8 . 04 3
Employment by sector
Formal sector (in percent of total employment) 63.0 61.0 57.7
Federation 67.2 68.1 63.7
Republika Srpska 59.1 54.6 51.3
Informal sector (in percent of total employment)
1 37.0 39.0 42.3
Federation 32.8 31.9 36.3
Republika Srpska 40.9 45.4 48.7
Source: LSMS and staff estimates. Includes panel observations only.
Note: Due to routing errors, a number of labor market indicator cannot be calculated using
the 2003 wave. For simplicity, this table does not report any summary data from this wave at all.
1The informal sector consists of two groups, following the BH Labor Market study (World Bank
2002): (i) unpaid, contributing family members, farmers on own farm, and workers engaged in other
activity (such as sale of agricultural products); (ii) workers not employed in the public sector or in












The unemployment rate increased between 2001 and 2002 and has been more or 
less stable since then. The unemployment rate was about 16 percent in 2001, rose to 21.6 
                                                 
4 This is based on a sample of transition economies using the latest available ILO (Key Indicators of the 
Labor Market) data. Data are available from the authors on request. See also Paci (2002) for a comparison 
of gender differentials in labor market outcomes, among other indicators, in the ECA region. 
  4percent in 2002 and is 22.2 percent in 2004.
5 At 22 percent, unemployment in BH is 
among the highest in the ECA region, second only to FYR Macedonia based on 2002 
data drawn from Labor Force Surveys (World Bank 2005b). 
6  On average, most 
unemployment rates in other transition economies are within 10-15 percent range. 
 
The aggregate unemployment figure in BH masks considerable variations 
between entities (i.e., the second tier of government: the Federation of BH and the 
Republika Srpska), regions, and selected demographic groups. For example, 
unemployment rate by entity evolved differently in recent years. While the 
unemployment rate fell in Federation of BH (FBH) between 2002 and 2004, it increased 
in the Republika Srpska (RS) over the same period. Men and women also have different 
unemployment rates, with the women consistently experiencing higher (by 2-5 
percentage points) unemployment rates over the last four years. Youth unemployment 
rates are very high, 2-3 times higher than the national average. Unemployment rate in 
2004 is 62 percent and 37 percent for those between 15-19 years of age and 20-24 years 
of age, respectively. The disparity between youth unemployment and average 
unemployment has been relatively constant over time. 
 
Employment rates remain low although they have increased in recent years. The 
employment rate for people of working age increased from about 40 to 46 percent 
between 2001 and 2004. Among male workers, the employment rates increased from 54 
to 59 percent, among female workers, from 27 to 32 percent. The employment rate in 
FBH steadily increased from 34.6 to 43.4 percent in 2004 while in the RS, the 
employment rate was steady at about 46-47 percent. Like the unemployment rate and 
labor force participation rate, the employment rate for BH is at the lower end of the ECA 
spectrum, where employment rates are typically within the 50 to 70 percent range. 
 
The informal sector is growing. 
Informal employment may be defined 
as employment in productive, income-
generating activities, but without the 
typical obligations and benefits 
associated with a formal labor contract, 
such as pension fund contributions, 
health and disability insurance. The 
LSMS survey allows us to estimate the 
magnitude of informal sector activity 
using two pieces of information at the 
individual level: their employment 













                                                 
5 It is not clear what has driven the surge in unemployment between 2001 and 2002. The LSMS was the 
first household survey in years and subject to sampling issues. The 2001 estimate should not be treated as 
an exact data point. 
6 An alternative measure is registered unemployment. But is this a useful concept? In 2001, only 24 percent 
of registered unemployed qualified as unemployed using the ILO definition. In 2002 and 2004, it was 37 
and 39 percent, respectively. While there is increasing consistency over time, the numbers still suggest that 
registration appears to be driven by other consideration, such as health services entitlement (see World 
Bank 2002). 
  5activity and whether their pension contributions were paid. This allows us to define an 
informal sector comprising of two groups: (i) unpaid, contributing family members, 
farmers on own farm, and workers engaged in other activity (such as sale of agricultural 
products); (2) workers not employed in the public sector or in international organization 
and whose pension contributions were not paid. This definition is consistent with the 
2002 BH labor market study (World Bank 2002). 
 
Using this working definition, the BH labor market may then be characterized by 
a duality of a rigid formal labor market dominated by large and state-owned enterprises 
and a flexible informal labor market dominated by micro-enterprises (those with fewer 
than 10 employees), typically in the low-productivity agricultural sector. Between 2001 
and 2004, the share of informal sector employment in total employment grew, from 37 
percent to 42 percent.
7 While the share of informal sector employment grew in both 
entities, the informal sector now accounts for close to half of all employment in the 
Republika Srpska (RS). 
 
Informal sector employment is predominantly in agriculture, followed by 
construction and manufacturing (Figure 1). Over the last four years, the share of 
construction sector employment in total informal sector employment has fallen slightly 
while the manufacturing sector share has increased. Self-employment accounts for a 
steadily increasing share of total informal employment. In 2001, it accounted for 29 
percent of total informal sector employment. Currently it represents over 34 percent. 
 
What are the covariates of informality? Education is negatively related to the 
probability of informal sector employment, and has become more so over time. Age is 
nonlinearly related to informality: The incidence of informal sector employment is 
initially high among younger workers; it then falls steadily until about age 44, at which 
point it starts rising again. 
 
Wage Outcomes 






















2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: LSMS and staff estimates.
Note: Wage deciles are based on the distribution of net monthly earnings in 2001. The sample is restricted to panel 
observations who were employed in 2001.
Over the last four years, wages 
increased in real terms across the wage 
distribution, except for the highest 
paid workers. Figure 2 depicts average 
real net monthly earnings by earnings 
deciles for a sample of employed 
workers drawn from panel 
observations, based on their observed 
earnings in 2001. The empirical 
evidence suggests that in general, 
                                                 
7 The BH labor market study found that informal sector employment accounted for 36 percent of total 
employment in 2001 (World Bank 2002). The growth of the informal sector between 2001 and 2002 is also 
documented in the CEM (World Bank 2005a). The relative size of the informal sector is consistent with 
existing estimates of the so-called “grey economy” in percent of GDP (about 40-57 percent) (see for 
example IMF 2004b; Kadic 2005). 
  6workers who were relatively lower 
paid in 2001 experienced faster 
increases in wages while those who 
were better paid experienced slower 
increases. The highest decile in fact 
experienced, first, a decline in real 
earnings between 2001 and 2002 and 
then a steady increase thereafter; the 
lowest decile experienced a 
particularly sharp increase in 2002, 
then increased more moderately after. 
Simple averages by decile, however, 
may be subject to measurement errors. 












2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: LSMS Panel Data; IMF World Economic Outlook database; and World Bank staff estimates.
 
Wages have increased rapidly in the formal sector but not in the informal sector 
(Figure 3). The labor market as a whole experienced rapid real wage growth since 2001, 
outpacing productivity growth (GDP per capita growth). Estimates of the evolution of 
output prices and unit labor costs among enterprises in BH over the period 1998-2003 
signify that the evidence is consistent with a profit squeeze in FBH (IMF 2004a), 
potentially affecting international competitiveness adversely, and depressing employment 
growth in the process. The data also suggest that corporate profits have been falling 
steadily over the last five years. The CEM (World Bank 2005b) reports that wages are 
high by regional standards and are not underpinned by proportionately higher labor 
productivity. 
 
Across sectors, there are wide disparities in wage increases. The increase in 
formal sector wages, for example, outpaced the average wage increase while informal 
sector wages have been relatively flat. The increases in formal sector wages seem to have 
been led by relatively high paying firms and the government sector. In addition, 
indexation mechanisms, such as wage floors in collective arrangements being indexed 
monthly to average wages or the experience premium, have facilitated the spillovers of 
the wage increases to the rest of the economy. These wage settings systems are 
comparable to those of other countries in the region.
8 In South Eastern Europe and in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), wage determination is still heavily 
influenced by the government, underpinned by a high share of the public sector in 
employment and privatized enterprises that reflect the behavior of state enterprises 
(World Bank 2005b). In BH as in some other economies, centralized wage setting 
systems have led to rapid formal sector wage increases, which in turn, have contributed to 
depressed employment generation in the formal sector, as evidenced by the growing 
informality of the labor market. 
 
                                                 
8 The system is centralized on paper but appears much less so for the economy at large. 
  7Within the informal sector, 
there is a marked heterogeneity in
earnings outcomes. The outcomes 
depend in part on whether a worker is 
self-employed or wage-employed, in 
agriculture or in other sectors. There 
are clear differences, for example, in 
the earnings levels by distinct 
subgroups within the informal sector 
(Figure 4). There are also disparities in 
the changes in earnings levels over 
time. The self-employed agricultural 
workers within the informal sector, for example, have the lowest reported net earnings in 
absolute terms. They have also experienced a decline in earnings over the 2003 to 2004 
period, with net earnings levels currently below th
Table 2. Long-Term Unemployed
(In percent of all unemployed)
2001 2002 2003
Duration of unemployment
Less than 1 month 1.9 1.4 2.32
1-3 months 13.0 5.0 5.77
4-6 months 8.5 6.9 6.5
7-11 months 6.7 4.1 5.63
1 year or more 69.8 82.5 79.8
Source: LSMS and staff estimates.
 net 
e 2001 period.  
                                                
Figure 4. Real Net Monthly Earnings 

















2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: LSMS and staff estimates.
 
Not surprisingly, earnings inequality is much higher in the informal sector, at least 
in the FBH. For the BH labor market as a whole, the Gini coefficient of the formal sector 
earnings distribution is 0.31 while the informal sector distribution is 0.35, based on 
nominal earnings. However, most of the aggregate difference in distribution appears to be 
driven by FBH (Gini coefficient is 0.30 in the formal sector and 0.37 in the informal 
sector, using nominal earnings). Overall consumption inequality is virtually the same in 
the two sectors, and essentially unchanged over the last four years at 0.26, suggesting the 
mitigating role of transfers, among other things.
9  
 
For the panel sample of workers, wage inequality fell over the last four years, by 
2-3 points, while preserving the gap between formal sector and informal sector wage 
inequality.  Even more striking is the disparity in wage inequality between formal sector 
and informal sector workers within selected industries. For example, within the 
agriculture sector, the Gini coefficient of formal sector distribution is 0.28 while the 
informal sector is 0.39. 
 
 
III.  Labor Market Transition in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Is there a core of long-term 
unemployed in BH? The incidence of long-
term unemployment (long term 
unemployment as a proportion of total 
unemployment), depending on its 
magnitude, may indicate substantial social 
costs. Long-term unemployment may lead 
 
9 This is consistent with the consumption inequality reported in the Poverty Assessment (World Bank 
2003). The disparity in wage inequality between the formal and informal sectors is also broadly consistent 
with the disparity reported in the BH labor market study (World Bank 2002). 
  8to the erosion of useful skills, discouragement, and eventual exits out of the labor force 
(World Bank 2005b; Cazes and Nesporova 2003). There are two options for measuring 
long-term unemployment or the share of those unemployed for a year or longer, as a 
proportion of total unemployed. First, the LSMS survey directly elicits information on the 
job search period. In particular, survey respondents are asked how long they have been 
looking for a job or trying to start their own business. The responses may be anywhere 
from less than a month to over 10 years. Because these are own-assessments of the 
duration of job search, this may be prone to measurement errors. The alternative is to 
infer long-term unemployment status data from actual employment status in each of the 
survey years. Thus, the long-term unemployed in 2004 would be those who were also 
documented to be unemployed in preceding years.  
 
There is evidence that a substantial core of long-term unemployed workers exists. 
This is confirmed by our two measures, although both—the second measure in 
particular—are complicated by the absence of suitable proxies of ILO-consistent 
unemployment in 2003. Not surprisingly, there is a wide discrepancy between the two 
estimates. Based on the first measure (Table 2), the data suggests that about 70-80 
percent of the unemployed have been unemployed for a year or longer. Based on the 
second measure, the data suggest that about 37 percent are long-term unemployed. We 
favor the second measure because it is based on observed, rather than self-reported, long-
term unemployment.
10 As a rough benchmark, the average incidence of long term 
unemployment in the ECA region is about 50 percent.
11 Both measures suggest that there 
is a larger core of long-term unemployed in RS. The second measure, for example, 
suggests that the incidence of long term unemployment is about 30 percent in FBH 
compared to 44 percent in RS. 
 
                                                 
10 We also find it informative that this second measure is lower than self-reported long-term 
unemployment, possibly for reasons similar to the discrepancy between ILO unemployment and registered 
unemployment. However, this second measure may still be upwardly biased because the status of survey 
respondents is not observed continuously between rounds. 
11 This is based on a sample of 13 transition economies over the 1999 to 2002 period drawn from the ILO-
KILM database. Data are available from the authors on request. 
  9Table 3. Transition Probabilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: All, 2001-2004
(In percent)
Employment Status in 2004
Employed
Inactive Unemployed






(1) (2) (3) = (3A) + (3B) (3A) (3B) (4) = (1) + (2) + (3)
Employment Status in 2001
All
Inactive 63.3        15.3        21.3        8.1        13.2        100.0       
Unemployed 29.9        27.4        42.7        20.0        22.7        100.0       
All employed 13.0        8.3        78.7        54.4        24.3        100.0       
Employed in the formal sector 9.5        5.7        84.9        73.2        11.7        100.0       
Employed in the informal sector 19.6        13.3        67.2        19.1        48.1        100.0       
Women
Inactive 72.1        11.6        16.3        5.3        11.0        100.0       
Unemployed 46.7        18.7        34.6        18.5        16.1        100.0       
All employed 19.7        6.3        74.0        54.3        19.7        100.0       
Employed in the formal sector 12.2        5.6        82.3        74.2        8.1        100.0       
Employed in the informal sector 33.9        7.7        58.4        16.8        41.7        100.0       
Men
Inactive 46.5        22.5        31.0        13.6        17.4        100.0       
Unemployed 19.6        32.7        47.7        21.0        26.7        100.0       
All employed 9.6        9.3        81.1        54.4        26.7        100.0       
Employed in the formal sector 8.1        5.7        86.2        72.7        13.5        100.0       
Employed in the informal sector 12.3        16.1        71.6        20.2        51.4        100.0       
Source: LSMS and staff estimates.
Note: Includes working age population only.  
 
Table 3 summarizes the flows among employment (further disaggregated into 
formal and informal sector employment), unemployment and leaving the labor force. The 
first column on the left hand side indicates the labor force status of workers in 2001 while 
all the other columns indicate the distribution of these workers across various labor 
market states in 2004. For example, of those who were out of the labor force in 2001, 63 
percent remained inactive, 15 percent were unemployed in 2004, while the rest found 
employment either in the formal sector or more likely in the informal sector. These 
proportions can be interpreted as the probability of moving from one labor market state to 
another over the four year period; the annual transition probabilities (not shown but 
available on request) are broadly consistent with these flows. 
 
Transition probabilities in the BH labor market are broadly comparable with those 
of Central and Eastern European countries, Western European countries, and a sample of 
middle-income countries in Latin America (see Appendix Tables 1 and 2). In particular, 
the flows from employment to unemployment or from unemployment to jobs in BH are 
similar to other transition economies. Flows from inactivity to either unemployment or 
employment have been somewhat larger than most countries, underpinning the rapid 
increase in labor force participation in recent years.  
 
  10While comparable with other countries, however, outflow rates from 
unemployment to jobs remain low, accounting for high and persistent unemployment in 
BH. The flows in BH also reflect the same challenges faced by other economies in 
transition. For example, the flows from employment to inactivity exceed the flows from 
employment to unemployment.  
 
The flows from unemployment to inactivity are also non-negligible. In addition, 
there are important distributive dimensions not captured by aggregate flows. Compared to 
men, a disproportionately large share of unemployed women subsequently leave the labor 
force, more than twice the average flow from unemployment to inactivity among men. In 
fact, across all labor market flows, women are consistently worse off. The flows from 
inactivity to employment or from unemployment to employment are smaller; the flows 
into inactivity or unemployment are larger. Compared to other countries in the region for 
which disaggregated data are available, the labor market transitions experienced by 
women in BH have been disappointing. 
 
More systematic analyses of labor market flows confirm the relative disadvantage 
of women, as well as, to some extent, the younger, less-educated workers. We estimate a 
multinomial logit model of labor market transitions by state of origin: employment, 
unemployment, and inactivity. We follow the specification of previous models of 
transition probabilities (see for example Lauerova and Terrell 2002; Bukowskiy and 
Lewandowski, 2005) and analyze the impact of standard covariates. In particular, 
following Lauerova and Terrell (2002) we estimate as follows the probability of an 
individual moving from one labor market state (employment, unemployment, or 
inactivity) into another, conditional on being in a particular previous state: 
 
∑














          ( 1 )  
where j, k = 1,2,3 represent the labor market states (employment, unemployment, or 
inactivity); j represents the destination and k the origin state; i represents the individual 
and Zi the characteristics of the individual. The variables included in the Z-matrix are: 
gender, age, marital status, and educational attainment. We also included geographic 
dummies. We measure the transitions from one labor market state into another between 
2001 and 2002 and between 2002 and 2004. We are unable to use data from 2003 
because a “routing error” prevents the calculation of ILO-consistent unemployment 
measures. The base groups are as follows: female, 15-24 years of age, elementary or 
unfinished elementary school education, and living in Banja Luka municipality. The 
standard errors are corrected for stratification and intra-cluster-correlation. 
 
The summary results are reported in Table 4 for the period 2001 and 2002 and in 
Table 5 for period 2002 and 2004. They provide strong evidence that there are indeed 
significant differences in labor market transitions by gender, age, education, and 
geographic (municipal dummies). For example, more educated workers are less likely to 
leave employment for unemployment. They are also less likely to transition from 
employment to inactivity.  
  11 
Table 4. Multinomial Logit Model: Labor Market Transitions: 2001-2002
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Employment Transitions Unemployment Transitions Inactivity Transitions
to Inactivity to Unemployment to Inactivity to Employment to Unemployment to Employment
Men -0.815*** 0.278 -0.926** 0.823** 0.779*** 0.892***
(0.165) (0.229) (0.432) (0.350) (0.157) (0.174)
Age (years)
25-44 -0.951*** -0.472 -0.200 0.328 0.542** 1.100***
(0.315) (0.329) (0.325) (0.409) (0.263) (0.288)
44-54 -0.630* -1.333*** 0.246 0.784 -0.118 0.953***
(0.335) (0.432) (0.535) (0.533) (0.288) (0.352)
55+ 0.290 -1.442** 2.410** 1.783 -2.616*** -0.269
(0.340) (0.610) (1.201) (1.310) (0.421) (0.399)
Single 0.146 0.708*** 0.121 -0.821** 0.269 0.374
(0.262) (0.244) (0.341) (0.346) (0.247) (0.308)
Education
Vocational -0.657*** -0.333 -0.070 -0.080 1.205*** 0.771***
(0.213) (0.257) (0.347) (0.352) (0.203) (0.172)
High School -0.547* -0.703** 0.057 0.172 0.646*** 0.336
(0.324) (0.282) (0.453) (0.425) (0.198) (0.226)
College -1.269*** -1.070** -0.574 0.274 1.713** 0.133
(0.411) (0.539) (1.120) (0.895) (0.705) (0.614)
University -3.675*** -1.108** -33.627*** 0.818 0.257 1.180**
(1.038) (0.453) (1.010) (1.133) (1.042) (0.550)
Constant -0.224 -1.873*** 0.108 -0.191 -2.573*** -2.037***
(0.422) (0.505) (0.629) (0.669) (0.392) (0.380)
Number of Obs 2126 422 2439
Note: The following are base groups: Female, 15-24 years of age, elementary or unfinished elementary school education, Banja Luka municipality.




  12Table 5. Multinomial Logit Model: Labor Market Transitions: 2002-2004
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Employment Transitions Unemployment Transitions Inactivity Transitions
to Inactivity to Unemployment to Inactivity to Employment to Unemployment to Employment
Men -0.925*** 0.285 -1.926*** -0.252 1.012*** 1.166***
(0.159) (0.207) (0.440) (0.476) (0.163) (0.167)
Age (years)
25-44 -0.484 -0.814*** 0.341 0.065 0.645*** 0.458
(0.300) (0.283) (0.398) (0.371) (0.239) (0.280)
44-54 0.476 -1.130*** 0.934 0.535 -0.538* -0.267
(0.331) (0.397) (0.568) (0.634) (0.294) (0.289)
55+ 1.475*** -3.524*** 24.235*** 22.287 -3.163*** -1.459***
(0.386) (1.090) (0.887) (0.531) (0.352)
Single 0.130 -0.118 -0.046 -0.553 0.748*** 0.362
(0.245) (0.231) (0.335) (0.379) (0.209) (0.283)
Education
Vocational -0.602*** -0.380 -0.030 1.190** 0.428** 0.818***
(0.189) (0.237) (0.373) (0.457) (0.168) (0.143)
High School -1.141*** -0.782** 0.428 0.761 0.113 0.478**
(0.250) (0.317) (0.464) (0.516) (0.208) (0.184)
College -0.944*** -0.328 -1.455 1.715* 2.277*** 0.943
(0.349) (0.395) (1.485) (0.996) (0.783) (0.614)
University -2.339*** -1.833*** -33.714*** 0.766 0.487 0.780*
(0.484) (0.532) (1.308) (1.134) (0.939) (0.418)
Constant -0.869** -0.783** 1.162 0.821 -1.926*** -1.746***
(0.432) (0.388) (0.905) (0.781) (0.341) (0.342)
Number of Obs 2107 421 2306
Note: The following are base groups: Female, 15-24 years of age, elementary or unfinished elementary school education, Banja Luka municipality.
Standard errors are corrected for stratification and intra-cluster correlation.
 
 
The results also indicate measurable labor market disadvantages among women. 
For example, men are less likely to leave employment for inactivity. Men are also more 
likely to transition out of inactivity into employment. And, at least between 2001 and 
2002, men were more likely to move out of unemployment back into employment, 
holding other things constant. 
 
The results with respect to age are more mixed. Young workers (less than 25 
years of age) are more likely to go into inactivity and unemployment. Between 2001 and 
2002, they were also less likely to move out of inactivity. However, between 2002 and 
2004, they seemed more likely to move out of inactivity. 
 
 
IV.  Labor Market Outcomes and Welfare 
 
How do labor market dynamics documented in the previous section relate to the 
welfare of workers, its evolution and its distribution? A first step would be a conceptual 
understanding of how economic growth translates into welfare outcomes and specific 
gains for the poor. In principle, there are a number of channels linking growth 
opportunities to welfare outcomes for the poor or workers at various points of the welfare 
distribution. This is illustrated using a simple framework depicted in Figure 5. The labor 
market is a principal channel through which economic growth translates into poverty 
reduction.  The working poor gain from higher wages while the unemployed poor gain 
  13from new employment opportunities. Meanwhile, the non-working or economically 
inactive poor gain from increased public and private transfers.  
 
 








Both access to these opportunities and their scale are mitigated by government 
policies, geographic location, gender and other demographic characteristics. Welfare 
outcomes at the individual level are also driven by the labor market activities of other 
members of individuals’ respective household. To understand changes in the welfare of 
the poor, it is critical to consider improvements or deteriorations in their wage levels, 
their employment opportunities, and the transfers they receive, along with changes in 
other mitigating factors. In BH case, we can also speculate on the role of recent changes 
in the first two channels (wage and employment opportunities), if any, in explaining 
recent poverty outcomes.  
 
What do we know of the recent evolution of poverty? In BH, the poverty 
headcount is essentially unchanged between 2001 and 2004. The poverty headcount has 
fallen from 19.5 percent to 17.8 percent, although the reduction in poverty appears to be 
statistically insignificant. When we restrict the analysis to just the panel observations, the 
poverty headcount is essentially unchanged at 17.7 percent. 
 
The unemployed generally face the highest incidence of poverty, compared to the 
employed and those out of the labor force, although it has decreased slightly over time 
(Figure 6). In particular, the incidence of poverty among the unemployed is 31 percent 

































  14and 29 percent for 2001 and 2004, respectively. The relative poverty risk for the 
employed and those not in the labor force is broadly unchanged. Those out of the labor 
force still constitute the largest share of the poor, followed by the unemployed, the 
informally employed, and the formally employed. 
 
There are substantial differences between men and women in the way the labor 
market mediates their welfare outcomes. For example, the predominance among the poor 
of individuals who are out of the labor force is driven in large part by women. Among 
women, about two-thirds of the poor are out of the labor force (Figure 7). Together with 
the unemployed, those out of the labor force account for over 80 percent of poor women. 
In contrast, only about 28 percent of the men are out of the labor force. Together with the 
unemployed, those out of the labor force account for a little over 50 percent of poor men. 
 
Informal sector workers face high and increasing relative poverty risk. Relative to 
formal sector workers, informal sector workers have a higher incidence of poverty and 
the disparity in relative poverty risk has widened over the last four years. In particular, 
the disparity in poverty headcount grew between 2001 and 2004, with formal sector 
workers experiencing decreasing poverty risk over time (the poverty headcount dropped 
from 12 to 9 percent) while informal sector workers experienced increasing poverty risk 
(the poverty headcount rose from 16 to 19 percent).  
 
In general, there is no necessary relationship between informal employment and 
poverty, especially in transition economies where formal sector employment itself may 
be characterized by a degree of uncertainty of earnings (in the form of wage delays, for 
example) and where informal employment may, in contrast, be associated with high-
reward entrepreneurial activities. In the case of BH, however, there are strong reasons to 
think that informal sector activities are associated with lower productivity and greater 
inequality of outcomes, as data on the inequality of wages, for example, would suggest. 
The Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) (World Bank 2005a) also argues that firms 
in this sector face limits on their ability to grow and obstacles to exporting and 
integration into European production chains. In addition, transition probabilities (Table 3) 
suggest that the flows from employment to either inactivity or unemployment are much 
higher in the informal sector than in the formal sector, especially among women. 
 
Low education is associated with higher poverty risk, but the risk-education 
relationship is broadly unchanged between 2001 and 2004. There is some increase in risk 
for those with vocation and high school education and some decrease among those with 
college or higher education. 
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Source: LSMS and staff estimates.
Note: Includes the working-age population (15-64) only. The X axis represents the distribution of the poor by labor force status while 
the Y axis represents the poverty headcount by labor force status. For example, those who are unemployed have the highest poverty 
headcount but they account for a smaller fraction of the poor, compared to those out of the labor force.
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Note: Includes the working-age population (15-64) only. The X axis represents the distribution of the poor by labor force 
status while the Y axis represents the poverty headcount by labor force status. For example, those who are unemployed have 
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Transitions out of Poverty 
 
While the aggregate poverty headcount is unchanged, few may be considered 
“chronic poor.”  More than half the poor in 2001 moved out of poverty in 2004. The key 
drivers of such outflows are described below. 
 













Wages of those who 
moved out of poverty
2004
Workers who moved out of 
poverty experienced very large 
increases in wages. While aggregate 
wages rose sharply over the last four 
years, outstripping the growth of GDP 
per capita, the wages of those who 
moved out of poverty grew even faster 
(Figure 8). The increase in wages 
among those who moved out of poverty 
is close to double the increase in 
average wages and close to four times 
the rate of increase in the informal 
sector. This is consistent with the previous analysis of wage increases by wage deciles, 
where low-paid workers experienced relatively sharper increases in wages. 
 
Movement out of poverty is related to the labor market performance, especially 
among male workers. Many workers who moved out of poverty between 2001 and 2004 
also moved from out of the labor force or from unemployment into employment. A 
significant fraction also moved from informal employment into formal employment, 
underscoring the role of wages and productivity in lifting people out of poverty. These 
labor market developments are especially pronounced among males. For example, of men 
who were unemployed and in poverty in 2001, over half transitioned into employment 
and out of poverty in 2004. Among those who were out of the labor force in 2001, over 
42 percent moved into employment in 2004. And of those who were employed informally 
in 2001, over 57 percent subsequently found jobs in the formal sector. Finally, many of 
those already employed in the formal sector held on to their formal sector jobs. 
 
In contrast, only 36 percent of men who were in poverty throughout the period 
(the “chronic poor”) moved from unemployment into employment. Of the 36 percent, 
over two-thirds found employment in the informal sector, where wages have been 
stagnant. Of those who were employed in the formal sector in 2001, a significant share 
(36 percent) moved into informal sector employment. 
 
Among female workers, the relationship between exits out of poverty and labor 
market performance is less clear. In general, labor market performance matters more for 
males than for females, who have much lower rates of labor force participation. Of those 
who were unemployed in 2001, many remained unemployed or left the labor force 
completely by 2004.  
  17 
Education is also positively related to movement out of poverty. Workers with 
higher education have higher probabilities of transition out of poverty. 
 
The State-Owned Enterprises Sector 
 
Figure 9. EBRD Index of Large-Sc
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More than 75 percent of enterprise 
assets in private ownership
The privatization of large-scale 
enterprises is a key challenge and 
priority for the Government of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as laid out in the 2004 
Medium-Term Development Strategy 
(MTDS). Since the 1995 Dayton 
Agreement, the privatization of small 
and medium-sized enterprises has made 
significant progress. However, the 
privatization of large state-owned 
enterprises (those employing over 50 
employees with KM 5 million in 
capital, around $2.5 million using exchange rates in 2004) has proceeded very slowly due 
to lukewarm political commitment. To date, several hundred large enterprises are yet to 
be privatized, in contrast to the rest of the ECA region where privatization has largely 
been completed (Figure 9).  
 
Nonetheless, in an economic environment characterized by a lagging privatization 
and restructuring program, labor market adjustment—or the reallocation of labor away 
from loss-making enterprises into enterprises in other sectors—has apparently taken place 
anyway. The next section provides evidence that while large privatization has largely 
stalled, many workers surveyed in the LSMS have apparently left the State Owned 
Enterprise (SOE) sector over the last four years or are reporting that their main 
employment activity currently lies outside the SOE sector. 
  
SOE Employment Dynamics 
 
SOE employment is dominated by men, older workers, and relatively more 
educated workers. Employment in relatively larger enterprises (over 100 employees) 
account for the majority of SOE employment. Workers in manufacturing, utility, and 
transport, storage and communication sectors represent the majority of SOE workers in 
both entities. There is a large share of SOE workers employed in mining, too, but this is 
largely underpinned by state-owned mining enterprises in FBH. Compared to non-SOE 
workers, SOE workers are relatively older and more educated.  Men also account for a 
greater share of employment in the SOE sector than in the non-SOE sector. 
 
SOE employment has fallen over time, coinciding with rapid increases in wages. 
As a share of total employment, employment in state-owned enterprises has fallen from 
35.6 percent in 2001 to 20.5 percent in 2004.
12 As a share of formal sector employment, 
                                                 
12 Falling public sector employment, observed between 2001 and 2002, is documented in the CEM. 
  18SOE employment has fallen from 56 percent in 2001 to 35.5 percent in 2004. In absolute 
terms, SOE workers are estimated to currently number about 221,900 using estimates of 
the SOE share of workers drawn from theLSMS and the corresponding figure for total 
official (formal) employment in BH (about 634,000). 
 
Along with aggregate decreases in SOE employment are proportional decreases in 
the RS and FBH. In the RS, SOE employment now accounts for a mere 16 percent of 
total employment, compared to 24 percent in FBH. Across all industries, SOE share of 
total employment fell, with especially large fall in the manufacturing sector (from 71 
percent to 38 percent). The smallest decrease in SOE employment is in the utilities sector. 
Some of the most SOE-dependent municipalities have seen their share of SOE-
employment fall between 2001 and 2004 from, for example, a high of 88 percent of 
formal sector employment to 31 percent. 
 
It may be argued that decreases in SOE employment are driven in large part by 
employment in voucher-privatized companies, where privatization has taken place but 
effective restructuring has not effectively been carried out. In which case, the fall in SOE 
employment is a “nominal” adjustment and not real labor adjustment, i.e., SOE 
employment has fallen nominally but workers are still employed by privatized state 
enterprises that are otherwise essentially unchanged.  
 
Unfortunately, LSMS data do not allow us to establish whether an individual 
worker is employed by the same company over time. However, the data provide 
information on workers’ industry of employment and the size (number of employees) of 
their company. Using these two pieces of information, we can make inferences regarding 
the magnitude of “nominal” adjustment. In particular, if a given worker leaves the SOE 
sector between 2001 and 2004 but (a) he declares himself to be employed by the same 
industry and (b) the number of workers in his company remains essentially unchanged, 
then we use this as proxy for continued employment in a privatized company. Adding 
back into SOE employment these nominal adjustments, the results indicate that SOE 




How do these findings compare with other data sources that provide either direct 
or indirect estimates of the relative magnitude of SOE employment? First, estimates from 
BEEPS data provide complementary evidence that SOE employment has fallen over the 
1999-2002 while growing in de novo private enterprises (see also World Bank 2005a). 
While employment in privatized enterprises also fell during this period, employment in 
state-owned enterprises fell proportionally more, indicating that as a share of total 
employment, SOE employment must have fallen.  
                                                 
13 The results indicate that about 10 percentage points of workers employed outside the SOE sector in 2004 
were previously employed by the SOE sector in 2001. Of the 10 percentage points, only 3.6 percentage 
points appear to be employed by the same industry by companies of the same size. This suggests that a 
substantial share of the fall in SOE (from 35.6 to 20.5) is accounted for by “real” adjustments and, 
classifying as SOE workers those who appear to be employed by the same (but now privatized) company 
indicates that SOE employment still fell from 35.6 in 2001 to about 24.1 in 2001 (or 20.5 + 3.6). 
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Second, data from the EBRD also suggests that while the large-scale privatization 
program has effectively stalled, the private sector share of output has nonetheless grown 
steadily. While this observation is consistent with, say, the growing efficiency of existing 
private sector firms in producing output, it is also fully consistent with growing factor 
inputs (labor) among private firms, including the informal sector, and falling employment 
in state enterprises.  
 
Third, there are some data on sector-by-sector employment in the RS, 
disaggregated by enterprise ownership. Unfortunately, the forms of ownership reported 
include those of mixed private and public ownership. Depending on whether or not mixed 
forms of ownership are included, SOE employment in RS accounted for about 15 to 40 
percent of total (formal sector) employment in late-2003. According to the LSMS, SOE 
employment currently accounts for 30 percent of formal sector employment. Regardless 
of how SOE employment is calculated, averages drawn from semi-annual data available 
suggest that SOE employment in the RS has steadily fallen in recent years as private 
sector employment has grown.
14 
 
Fourth, summary data from the South-Eastern Europe Barometer (SEB) suggest 
that employment in state enterprises ranges from 16 to 24 percent, based on survey data 
collected in 2004. Available summary data do not allow us to calculate the weighted 
average of SOE employment for BH as a whole but the average drawn from the LSMS 
falls within the SEB estimates. 
 
These three data sources do not—separately, on their own—provide conclusive 
evidence that SOE employment has indeed fallen as a share of total employment but they 
do provide strong evidence that is broadly consistent with the LSMS findings. 
 
SOE Evolution and Poverty Outcomes 
 
What are the poverty and welfare outcomes for those who left the SOE sector and 
those who stayed?
15 On the one hand, those who left were likely to experience more 
severe wage arrears in 2001 and are now substantially less likely to experience wage 
delays. On the other hand, those who left seem more likely to be poor. The poverty 
headcount of those who left is about 20 percent, compared to 15 percent poverty rate for 
those who stayed.  
 
This puzzling result—the poverty outcomes of those who left the SOE sector 
being higher than those who stayed behind—seems driven largely by the poverty risk 
associated with the subsequent labor force status and sector of employment of those who 
left. Of the workers who were employed in the SOE sector in 2001 but subsequently left 
about 40 percent found employment in the formal sector (mostly in manufacturing) in 
2004 (Figure 10). The rest either became unemployed or left the labor force, or found 
                                                 
14 See RS Institute of Statistics (various issues). 
15 Due to the relatively few responses to the relevant survey question, the LSMS survey cannot effectively 
distinguish the reasons for leaving, whether it is due to dismissal, for example, or voluntary exit. 
  20employment in the informal sector. As expected, the poverty risks associated with these 
labor market states vary widely. In particular, there is a striking disparity between the 
formally employed and the informally employed among former SOE workers. The 
poverty headcount of the formally employed is a very low 10 percent. In contrast, the 
poverty headcount of those informally employed is 35 percent. Thus, while in principle, 
the informal sector serves as a safety net for labor market adjustment in transition 
economies, in the case of BH the informal sector is associated with substantial poverty 
risks.  
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Source: LSMS and staff estimates.
Note: Includes workers employed in SOE sector in 2001 and located elsewhere in 2004. The X axis represents the distribution of 
former SOE workers by labor force status in 2004 while the Y axis represents the poverty headcount by labor force status. For 
example, of former SOE workers, those who are unemployed or employed informally have high poverty headcounts but the 
unemployed account for a smaller fraction of the SOE workers, compared to those employed formally or informally.
 
 
V.  Policy Options and Constraints 
 
 
This paper takes stock of labor market developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BH) over the period 2001-2004. The evidence suggests that there are encouraging signs 
of labor market dynamism underpinned by rising participation rate and employment rate 
and relatively stable unemployment rate. But the labor market in BH remains a difficult 
economic environment. The participation rate employment rate remains relatively low, 
and the unemployment rate relatively high compared to other countries in the region. A 
number of selected groups bear a disproportionate burden of this environment: women 
have extremely low participation rates, perhaps the lowest in the ECA region. Of those 
who were unemployed four years ago, many women remain unemployed or have since 
left the labor force. The youth have very high unemployment rates, much higher than the 
BH average. And though formal sector wages have increased sharply, a striking feature 
of the labor market in BH is the growing share of employment in the informal sector, 
where, compared to the formal sector, wages are lower, more unequal (mainly in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and have grown more slowly over time. 
However, despite relatively dismal outcomes for the informal sector, on average, the 
evidence also reveals marked heterogeneity among workers in this sector, depending on 
the type of informality. 
 
  21This paper also relates labor market developments to the welfare of workers, the 
recent evolution of welfare, and its distribution. Over the period examined in this paper, 
the aggregate poverty headcount is unchanged but the poverty risk has evolved 
differently for selected sub-groups. Where averages wages have sharply increased—
mostly in the formal sector—the poverty risk has fallen. Where wages have remained 
broadly unchanged and where the relative share of total employment has expanded—
mostly in the informal sector—the poverty risk has increased. Those who are not in the 
labor force or unemployed constitute the biggest share of the poor. Of women in poverty, 
those who are not in the labor force account for two-thirds of the total. In contrast, only a 
little over a quarter of men in poverty are out of the labor force. There are also clearer 
links between men’s employment outcomes and their transitions out of poverty. Of the 
men initially out of the labor force or unemployed, a large share subsequently moved into 
employment and also moved out of poverty as a result.  
 
In this difficult labor market, there are good reasons for reviving the privatization 
and enterprise restructuring program. The long drawn-out processes of privatizing and 
restructuring public enterprises have merely postponed the necessary reforms and 
unnecessarily prolonged the lives of non-viable, loss-making enterprises and, in the 
process, it has constrained private-sector led development and the more productive use of 
resources for employment-generation. Enforcing financial discipline, quickly 
implementing privatization, and facilitating bankruptcy and closure can instead 
effectively compress the labor adjustment period and can possibly move forward strategic 
restructuring processes that subsequently lead to job creation in the medium-term. In the 
short-term, however, this strategy faces a number of critical challenges. We know, for 
example, that only about a third of those who left the SOE sector have since found 
employment in the formal sector. Instead, many of them fell into inactivity or 
unemployment, or joined the informal sector, facing elevated poverty risks as a result. 
 
Thus, renewed enterprise privatization and restructuring will also require 
complementary policies that create an enabling environment for job creation. The likely 
poverty and social impact of labor retrenchment following privatization and restructuring 
will depend in large part on how quickly affected enterprises rebound, or their ability to 
invest, adopt new technologies and hire new staff. Policies that promote competition, 
facilitate the entry of new firms, create the conditions for a level playing field, attract 
strategic foreign investors
16 (who enjoy some advantage in access to finance, new 
technologies, and new production processes) can ease the transition from defensive 
restructuring that leads to job destruction to strategic restructuring that leads to job 
creation (World Bank 2005b, World Bank 2005c). To remove barriers to entry and 
stimulate further enterprise creation, the CEM (World Bank 2005a) emphasizes the need 
to fully implement the new business registration system, streamline business inspection, 
and enforce competition policy. 
 
                                                 
16 There is evidence that foreign privatization is associated with increased employment and wages in a 
sample of countries (Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine), though these effects are not always 
statistically significant (World Bank 2005b). 
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  24Appendix Table 1. Transition Probabilities
Employment to Unemployment to Out of the Out of the
Employment to Out of the Unemployment to Out of the Labor Force to Labor Force to
Country Year Unemployment Labor Force Employment Labor Force Employment Unemployment
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001-2002 6.6           12.9           33.9           31.7           14.4           12.4          
Central and Eastern European Countries
Bulgaria 1994-1995 5.9           9.2           32.3           24.4           9.2           4.4          
Czech Republic 1998-1999 1.8           2.5           33.5           9.0           3.6           1.7          
East Germany 1990-1991 9.3           7.1           35.0           27.7           16.0           4.1          
Poland 1998-1999 3.3           3.9           26.0           17.0           3.3           2.3          
Slovakia 1994-1995 2.3           4.5           23.7           7.8           1.8           1.7          
Former Soviet Union
Estonia 1999-2000 5.4           4.1           27.9           6.9           6.1           3.2          
Latvia 1999-2000 3.9           6.1           30.4           21.3           6.1           1.7          
Lithuania 1999-2000 5.9           5.8           34.0           20.1           7.7           4.2          
Russia 1995-1996 5.6           6.2           39.5           14.5           7.6           3.4          
United States 1992-1993 2.8           5.3           65.9           28.8           4.3           16.1          
Latin America
Argentina 1993-2001 6.4           7.0           36.9           26.9           11.8           8.0          
Mexico 1990-2001 2.0           9.6           54.9           29.8           14.3           1.8          
Peru 1997-2000 5.7           11.7           45.1           34.4           25.7           63.5          
Western Europe
Austria 1995-1997 33.6           23.1          
Belgium 1990-1997 23.6           25.6          
Denmark 1990-1997 35.3           27.9          
Finland 1995-1997 26.9           27.2          
France 1990-1997 32.2           16.2          
Germany 1992-1997 25.4           25.0          
Greece 1990-1997 27.1           11.5          
Ireland 1990-1997 19.1           22.7          
Italy 1992-1997 22.4           30.2          
Portugal 1990-1997 35.8           22.4          
Spain 1990-1997 29.2           7.2          
Sweden 1996-1997 29.4           18.6          
United Kingdom 1990-1997 33.3           17.4          
Sources: Unless otherwise indicated, data are from Boeri and Terrell (2002), OECD (2000) and IADB (2003). For Poland (1998-1999), Ingham and
Ingahm (2005); for Bulgaria (1991-1992), Jones and Kato (1997); for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (1997-2000), Eamets (2004); for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
LSMS and staff estimates.
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Employment to Unemployment to Out of the Out of the
Employment to Out of the Unemployment to Out of the Labor Force to Labor Force to
Country Year Unemployment Labor Force Employment Labor Force Employment Unemployment
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001-2002
Men 7.5           8.9           41.2           23.7           20.9           16.8          
Women 5.0           20.7           22.4           44.3           10.9           10.0          
Central and Eastern European Countries
Bulgaria 1991-1992
Men 38.7           1.8          
Women 36.2           3.6          
Czech Republic 1993-1996
1
Men 0.6           1.1           26.7           6.7           2.5           0.5          
Women 0.7           1.5           23.2           7.5           1.7           0.5          
East Germany 1990-1991
Men 5.7           7.9           39.9           33.1           13.5           1.6          
Women 13.2           6.2           31.5           23.7           17.2           5.4          
Poland 1993-1994
Men 4.6           5.2           41.8           10.6           8.0           4.0          
Women 3.2           7.6           29.6           20.7           7.0           4.4          
Former Soviet Union
Russia 1995-1996
Men 6.9           4.7           41.0           10.0           6.4           4.0          




Men (prime age) 5.9           2.2           53.7           8.4           37.9           17.8          
Women (prime age) 4.5           10.5           28.2           40.8           12.1           7.6          
Mexico
2 1990-2001
Men (prime age) 1.8           1.3           75.9           7.9           40.7           6.1          
Women (prime age) 1.1           15.6           38.6           47.3           13.4           1.2          
Sources: For Czech Republic, East Germany, Poland, Russia Lauerova and Terrell (2002); for Argentina and Mexico, IADB (2003); for Bulgaria,
Jones and Kato (1997); for Bosnia and Herzegovina, LSMS and staff estimates.
1Average quarterly transition probabilities.
2Average six-month transition probabilities.
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